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AMICUS FILINGS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
TOWARD A GLOBAL VIEW OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION
Gordon R. Jimison'
Over one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court announced that
"[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination."' Since then, and especially since the start of the twenty-
first century, international law has appeared in the Supreme Court's
opinions in other contexts, not solely in cases involving international law
directly. Several opinions rendered since 2002 featured prominent
citations to briefs of amici curiae that were based on international law
arguments.3  These briefs referred to international law in order to
develop persuasive arguments where American history or precedent was
silent or unfavorable as to their authors' desired outcome.4 For purposes
of this Comment, international law encompasses not only treaties, but
also the laws of foreign countries, and significant declarations and policy
documents of international organizations.
This Comment will explore two topical areas: first, the use and format
of amicus filings, and second, the role of international law in persuasive
amicus filings. Three major decisions from 2002 and 2003 will anchor this
article's discussion: Atkins v. Virginia,5 Lawrence v. Texas,6 and Grutter v.
* Juris Doctor and Comparative and International Law Institute Certificate Candidate,
May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. The author
wishes to thank Professor Peter B. Rutledge for his sage guidance through the creation of
this Comment. The author also wishes to thank the editors of the Catholic University Law
Review for their work reviewing and polishing this Comment. Finally, the author would
like to thank his wife, Melissa, and his family and friends for their support and
encouragement.
1. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
2. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21.
4. See Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Robinson et al. in Support of Petitioners,
Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (No. 02-102) [hereinafter Mary Robinson Brief]; Brief of NOW
Legal Defense and Education et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
5. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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Bollinger.7 Each of these cases featured significant amicus involvement,
and taken together, they signal an important trend in constitutional
interpretation.
Constitutional interpretation is the ultimate concern of this Comment.
The central issue is whether the United States Supreme Court should
consider international law when it determines the meaning and
application of the United States Constitution. In other words, is every
constitutional issue one where questions of right may depend on
international law? And, on a more practical level, since the Court seems
receptive to international law arguments in amicus filings, a related issue
involves determining the most effective or persuasive way to use
international law as an advocacy tool.
I. "MUST BE ASCERTAINED AND ADMINISTERED": How SHOULD THE
SUPREME COURT Do ITS WORK?
The Supreme Court, sitting at the pinnacle of the American judicial
system, often decides cases whose outcomes reach far beyond the lives of
the named parties and their immediate interests. In making such
important determinations, the Court wisely accepts input from entities
other than the parties to a given dispute, including entities that might be
involved in similar situations and those whose course of action will be
impacted by the Court's decisions.8 This input comes from amici, friends
of the court, who submit detailed briefs supplementing the parties' briefs,
often in support of one of the parties, or, more accurately, in support of
an outcome that corresponds to the amicus's interests.9
At the Supreme Court, the outcome of a case is tantamount to a policy
decision, and, for that reason, one author suggests that policy arguments
are far more important to the Supreme Court than they are to other
courts.' ° The debate about the use of international law in the Court's
7. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
8. See Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 617-18 (1994) (describing the
difficulty of ascertaining that all interests affected by a given case will be implicated by the
parties' involvement).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). There, in dissent, Justice
Goldberg noted that
[a] traditional function of an amicus is to assert "an interest of its own separate
and distinct from that of the (parties)," whether that interest be private or public.
It is "customary for those whose rights (depend) on the outcome of cases ... to
file briefs amicus curiae, in order to protect their own interests."
Id. at 738 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting FREDERICK
BERNAYS WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS 269 (1961)).
10. Dan Schweitzer, Fundamentals of Preparing a United States Supreme Court
Amicus Brief, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 523, 524 (2003).
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decisions, then, is a debate about whether it is legitimate for the Court to
make such important policy determinations based on the decisions of
foreign courts, the policies of international institutions, or various
treaties-whether ratified by the United States or not."
Prominent scholars argue both in favor of and against the Court's use
of foreign materials. Harold Koh, Dean of Yale Law School and former
Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
argues that the Supreme Court has always, and rightly, relied on
international sources.'2 Such reliance is particularly important when
American legal rules parallel the rules of other nations, when other
nations' courts apply rules similar to American courts' rules, and,
perhaps most controversially, when an American constitutional provision
refers to "community standards" such as unusual punishment or due
11. In this respect, the United States Supreme Court differs notably from the
International Court of Justice (ICJ); the Supreme Court has no explicit guidance on what
sources to consider. The ICJ, according to Article 38 of its governing statute, may
consider:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice at 38(1), 1947 I.C.J. Acts and Docs. 37, 46,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm.
One author, as part of a case study of the Israeli Supreme Court, notes that several
factors converge and encourage courts to consult international materials as sources of law,
regardless of whether doing so is part of the court's governing statute or rules.
First, international agreements have become major factors in the economic and
political spheres in an age of globalization. Second, there is an increasing
tendency to bring disputes to international tribunals, notably exemplified in the
establishment of the International Criminal Court. Third, and more significant
to the discussion at hand, national courts are tending to increase their recourse to
international instruments, particularly in the context of applying international
human rights norms. This may be seen in those countries that are parties to the
European Convention on Human Rights, and in those that have adopted
constitutions that expressly mention the international law of human rights as a
source of inspiration. The process that culminated in the adoption of the
European Convention on Human Rights in the English Human Rights Act of
1998 is a prime example.
Daphne Barak-Erez, The International Law of Human Rights and Constitutional Law: A
Case Study of an Expanding Dialogue, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 611, 611-12 (2004) (footnotes
omitted).
12. Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43,
44-46 (2004); Yale Law School Faculty, http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/faculty/h
koh/profile.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
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process of law.13 Gerald Neuman, Professor of Federal Jurisprudence at
Columbia University School of Law, contends that arguments that
categorically bar application of international sources "play on
exaggerated fears: fear of foreign domination, fear of judicial activism,
fear of the unknown.', 14  Like Dean Koh, Professor Neuman draws
attention to the Court's historically extensive use of international
13. Koh, supra note 12, at 45-46. Dean Koh explains that the Court has long
considered foreign nations to be relevant communities for evaluating "community
standards" and cites a variety of Eighth Amendment cases as illustrations. Id. Koh also
suggests that turning to international precedent is good for international relations by
arguing that "for any nation consciously to ignore global standards not only would ensure
constant frictions with the rest of the world, but also would diminish that nation's ability to
invoke those international rules that served its own national purposes." Id. at 44. The
Court breaks down into two groups, according to Dean Koh. First are the proponents of
"'nationalist jurisprudence,' exemplified by the opinions of Justices Scalia and Clarence
Thomas," and "characterized by commitments to territoriality, extreme deference to
national executive power and political institutions, and resistance to comity or
international law as meaningful constraints on national prerogatives." Id. at 52. The other
camp follows the "more venerable strand of 'transnationalist jurisprudence,' now being
carried forward by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg," which recognizes "that one prominent
feature of a globalizing world is the emergence of a transnational law, particularly in the
area of human rights, that merges the national and international." Id. at 52-53; see also
Daniel Bodansky, The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion, 32 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 427-28 (2004) ("The policy interest in avoiding friction with the rest
of the world is reflected in the Charming Betsy doctrine, which states that, wherever
possible, statutes, and presumably the Constitution as well, should be construed so as to be
consistent with international norms.").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained its interpretation of
the relationship between international and domestic law by stating that
within the domestic legal structure, international law is displaced by "a properly
enacted statute, provided it be constitutional, even if that statute violates
international law." Those rulings, however, do not suggest that courts should
refrain from applying the Charming Betsy principle. Rather, they stand for the
proposition that when Congress has clearly abrogated international law through
legislation, that legislation nonetheless has the full force of law. Although
Congress may override international law in enacting a statute, we do not
presume that Congress had such an intent when the statute can reasonably be
reconciled with the law of nations.
Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 n.30 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
14. Gerald L. Neuman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (2004). Professor Neuman draws particular attention to Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), as a fundament of international law's application to the Eighth
Amendment. Neuman, supra, at 84. Citing the Trop plurality's emphasis on the dignity of
man and the "postwar international emphasis on the principle of human dignity,"
Professor Neuman notes that the plurality "expressly considered denationalization [as a
criminal penalty] . .. in light of contemporary international understandings" and holding
that it amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Id. Professor Neuman cites the
United States' "less intense engagement" in international human rights treaties and
regimes as one of the main reasons international human rights law has only occasionally
appeared directly in U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Id. at 86-87.
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sources. 5  T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dean of the Georgetown Law
Center, argues that the use of international law is a sign of a "maturing
legal system-one moving toward new understandings of sovereignty and
popular sovereignty appropriate to an increasingly interconnected web of
transnational legal relations.",
6
Conversely, Roger Alford, an associate professor of law at Pepperdine
University, argues that consideration of foreign sources-especially when
they are misused-impermissibly expands the canon of materials
legitimately considered in constitutional evaluation, a canon that
historically has encompassed the text, structure, and history of the
Constitution, as well as the history of the American people and their
national experience. 7  Alford also contends that including foreign
sources destabilizes constitutional decisionmaking and ignores the
Supremacy Clause.'
8
15. See Neuman, supra note 14, at 84.
16. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American
Constitutionalism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. 91, 91 (2004). Dean Aleinikoff suggests that customary international law
has always-and properly-been viewed as a tertium quid, neither federal nor
state law, but, rather, law to be applied in appropriate cases by federal courts in
instances where they otherwise possess jurisdiction .... This understanding of
[customary international law (CIL)] does not rule out the possibility that federal
common law relates to foreign relations; it simply treats that issue as distinct
from the question of the status of CIL.
Id. (footnote omitted).
17. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the Constitution, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 57-58 (2004).
18. Id. According to Professor Alford, "[u]sing international law as an interpretive
aid also ignores the Supremacy Clause, which renders all of our laws subject to, and not
source material for, our Constitution." Id. at 58. Professor Alford believes that "[tlo the
extent that value judgments are a source of constitutional understandings of community
standards, in the hierarchical ranking of relative values domestic majoritarian judgments
should hold sway over international majoritarian values." Id. Professor Alford's concern
is that
[r]eliance on global standards of decency undermines the sovereign limitations
inherent in federalist restraints, limitations born out of respect for the reserved
powers of the states to assess which punishments are appropriate for which
crimes. To the extent that international majoritarians argue that global
standards are relevant notwithstanding their inconsistency with American
standards, this view reflects far less respect for federalism concerns than required
by the Court.
Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted).
Dean Koh argues in response that "U.S. courts are not deferring to the will of the
majority of the world's peoples instead of deferring to American will; rather, our courts
are looking to foreign practice for additional evidence of modern standards of decency in a
civilized society." Koh, supra note 12, at 55 n.89.
Perhaps an answer to the subordination of "domestic majoritarian judgments" in
general lies in The Federalist:
20051
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Seeking a middle ground, Michael Ramsey of the University of San
Diego School of Law suggests a set of guidelines for "promoting rigorous
use of international materials to define domestic constitutional rights."' 9
Professor Ramsey identifies four such guidelines: carefully defining the
theories underlying the choice of materials to use and how to use them;
not using international sources for selective outcomes; getting the facts
right on the sources employed; and avoiding shortcuts to global
consensus to help prevent overstatement.2
The debate on the propriety of the Court's reliance on international
law is heated and embraces a plethora of viewpoints and suggestions.
What this debate is missing, and what this Comment endeavors to
present, is an evaluation of one method by which the Court is exposed to
international law arguments: the amicus brief. Are amicus briefs really
just general policy recommendations in disguise, and if they are, should
the Court pay them any mind?
21
This Comment examines the importance of amicus curiae filings at the
U.S. Supreme Court, particularly those citing international law. The
Comment discusses the relevant rules of amicus filing, as well as several
major cases decided in recent terms in which the Justices' opinions
reference not only persuasive amicus filings, but also compelling aspects
of international law. The Comment then turns to a close analysis of the
amicus briefs the Court cited, and proposes guidelines for what
constitutes an effective amicus brief. The Comment concludes with an
endorsement of the Court's use of international law and of the amicus
filing process as an effective advocacy tool for resolving the most
significant controversies of American law and society.
The members of the legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to those
qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges; and as, on this account,
there will be great reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective
information, so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party
divisions, there will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction
may poison the fountains of justice.
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 419 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
19. Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on
Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 72 (2004). See infra Section IV of the Comment
for a more thorough discussion of Professor Ramsey's arguments.
20. Id. at 72-80.
21. Consider the following language: "The analyses presented in the amicus briefs did
not depend upon the details of Mr. McCarver's specific case, and resubmitted briefs would
not focus on the details of Mr. Atkins' case." Joint Motion of All Amici in McCarver v.
North Carolina, No. 00-8727, to Have Their McCarver Amicus Briefs Considered in This
Case in Support of Petitioner at 1, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452),
2001 WL 1682012.
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II. "INTERNATIONAL LAW... PRESENTED": THE PROCESS OF FILING
AN AMICUS BRIEF AND STUDY OF THREE SIGNIFICANT CASES
This portion of the Comment will serve two purposes. First, it will
acquaint the reader with the Rules of the Supreme Court relevant to
preparing and filing amicus briefs, and second, it will evaluate three
recent decisions in which amicus filings played a significant role. This
Comment will address the Rules of the Supreme Court at the merits
22
stage.
A. Rules of the Supreme Court
Rule 37 of the Rules of the Supreme Court specifically governs amicus
filings, and outlines at its outset the purpose of, and limits on, amicus
filing:
An amicus curiae brief that brings to the attention of the Court
relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the
parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus
curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court,
and its filing is not favored.23
The corollary to this rule's provision that the amicus brief address
matters not already presented in the parties' briefs is that those who wish
to file as amici must familiarize themselves with the arguments advanced
22. Discussion of briefs at the certiorari stage is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For discussion of briefs at the certiorari stage, see Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 527-30.
23. Sup. CT. R. 37.1. Past Supreme Court practice was not so liberal in its acceptance
of amicus briefs. In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 191 U.S. 555 (1903), the Court
did not give amici leave to file because "[i]t [did] not appear that applicant [was]
interested in any other case which [would] be affected by the decision of this case; as the
parties [were] represented by competent counsel, the need of assistance [could not] be
assumed and consent [was not] given," id. at 556. On the importance of the identities of
the filers, see Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective
Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J. L. & POL. 33, 46-56 (2004). Lynch conducted a survey of
seventy former Supreme Court clerks and concluded, among other things, that the identity
of the filer can be very important; the Solicitor General was unquestionably the most
respected filer. Id. at 47. Lynch also found that eighty-eight percent of the clerks gave
special attention to briefs authored by prominent academics and reputed attorneys. Id. at
52-54. Note that the brief of Mary Robinson in Lawrence v. Texas was authored by
Harold Koh, now Dean of the Yale Law School, and the European Union's briefs in
McCarver v. North Carolina and Roper v. Simmons were authored by Richard J. Wilson, a
Professor at American University, Washington College of Law. Brief of Amici Curiae the
European Union and Members of the International Community in Support of
Respondent, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633); Mary Robinson Brief,
supra note 4; Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Union in Support of the Petitioner,
McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-8727) [hereinafter European
Union Brief].
2005]
Catholic University Law Review
by the parties, and must also show the relevance of the material to be
submitted to the Court.24
One way the Court ensures that amicus filings will not duplicate the
parties' arguments is by requiring that the parties consent to each amicus
filing at the merits stage.25 However, the Court may grant leave to file
even if one or both of the parties withholds consent. 6 One practitioner
suggests that as a general matter, the Court will grant timely motions to
file as amicus, and that counsel for the respective parties should consent
27to most filings as a result of this Court practice. Another aspect of the
rules governing the relationship between parties and amici lies in Rule
37.6, which requires most amici to describe any legal or financial
involvement the parties may have had in the preparation of the amicus
brief.28 The Rules of the Supreme Court provide exacting guidelines for
both the conceptual and technical aspects of amicus filing,29 and the
24. See Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 527.
25. Sup. CT. R. 37.3(a). The rule provides that "[a]n amicus curiae brief in a case
before the Court for oral argument may be filed if accompanied by the written consent of
all parties, or if the Court grants leave to file." Id. Some entities are exempt from filing a
motion prior to filing a brief:
No motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief is necessary if the brief is
presented on behalf of the United States by the Solicitor General; on behalf of
any agency of the United States allowed by law to appear before this Court when
submitted by the agency's authorized legal representative; on behalf of a State,
Commonwealth, Territory, or Possession when submitted by its Attorney
General; or on behalf of a city, county, town, or similar entity when submitted by
its authorized law officer.
Id. R. 37.4.
26. Id. R. 37.3(b). The relevant provision reads:
[W]hen a party to a case before the Court for oral argument has withheld
consent, a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief may be presented to the
Court. The motion, prepared as required by Rule 33.1 and as one document with
the brief sought to be filed, shall be submitted within the time allowed for filing
an amicus curiae brief, and shall indicate the party or parties who have withheld
consent and state the nature of the movant's interest.
Id.
27. Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 525.
28. Sup. CT. R. 37.6. In the first footnote of a brief, amici must disclose "whether
counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part and .. identify every person or
entity, other than the amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel, who made a monetary
contribution to the preparation or submission of the brief." Id. This rule exempts those
entities listed in Rule 37.4 from the disclosure requirements that apply to other amicus
filers. Id. See supra note 25 for a list of exempt entities.
29. See SUP. CT. R. 37. For example, page limits for amicus briefs are somewhat
shorter than for party briefs; at the merits stage, the limit for an amicus brief is thirty
pages, whereas the parties' briefs on the merits may be fifty pages. Id. R. 33.1(g). The
amicus brief must include a statement of the interest of the amicus, a summary of the
argument, the argument, and a conclusion, requirements that differ slightly from the
requirements for party briefs. Compare id. R. 37.5 with id. R. 24. Timing is also important
[Vol. 55:267
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potential filer must be cognizant of the rules at all stages of the filing
process.
B. Atkins v. Virginia-A Feeble Effort?
In Atkins v. Virginia,0 the Court considered the constitutionality of
capital proceedings against the mentally retarded, evaluating "whether
such executions are 'cruel and unusual punishments' prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution."" The Court's analysis
began by invoking the concept of proportionality; 32 then the Court
construed and applied the Eighth Amendment in light of "evolving
standards of decency" and concluded that the punishment at issue was
excessive."
In order to reach its conclusion, the Court considered a number of
factors, the first of which was state and federal legislation relevant to the
execution of the mentally retarded.34 The Court outlined state legislation
prohibiting the death penalty for the mentally retarded, 35 and noted that
for filing, and the Court requires that "[t]he brief shall be submitted within the time
allowed for filing the brief for the party supported, or if in support of neither party, within
the time allowed for filing the petitioner's or appellant's brief." Id. R. 37.3(a). Note also
that if the party the amicus supports receives an extension, the amicus also receives an
extension. Id.
30. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
31. Id. at 307.
32. Id. at 311. Proportionality refers to the "precept of justice that punishment for
crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
33. Id. at 311-12, 321 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)). The Court
was not "persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals [would] measurably
advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty." Id. at 321. The
court also noted that "[a] claim that punishment is excessive "is judged not by the
standards that prevailed in 1685 ... or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather by
those that currently prevail." Id. at 311.
34. Id. at 312-13. The Court emphasized that "the 'clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures."' Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
35. Id. at 313-16. The Court did not provide the number of states that had prohibited
the practice, but the Chief Justice did so in his dissent:
The Court pronounces the punishment cruel and unusual primarily because 18
States recently have passed laws limiting the death eligibility of certain
defendants based on mental retardation alone, despite the fact that the laws of 19
other States besides Virginia continue to leave the question of proper
punishment to ... sentencing judges or juries familiar with the particular
offender and his or her crime.
Id. at 321-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
In the Court's majority opinion, Justice Stevens apparently sought to deemphasize the
numerical balance by writing that "[i]t is not so much the number of these States that is
significant, but the consistency of the direction of change." Id. at 315 (majority opinion).
2005]
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the practice of executing the mentally retarded was uncommon. 6 The
Court concluded that "[t]he practice ... has become truly unusual, and it
is fair to say that a national consensus has developed against it."
37
The Atkins Court bolstered, some might say bootstrapped 3 s the
concept of national consensus in footnote twenty-one, with the
proclamation that "[a]dditional evidence makes it clear that this
legislative judgment reflects a much broader social and professional
consensus."39 The Court then cited the amicus briefs of two professional
organizationso and referenced the collective statement issued by a
number of religious communities, including Christian, Jewish, Muslim,
and Buddhist points of view, all condemning the questioned application
of the death penalty.4' The Court then turned its attention abroad,
stating that "within the world community, the imposition of the death
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved., 42 Thus, the amici brought a wide variety
of arguments to the Court's attention, a fact not lost on the dissenting
Justices.
43
36. Id. at 316. The Court also noted that "even among those States that regularly
execute offenders and that have no prohibition with regard to the mentally retarded, only
five have executed offenders possessing a known IQ less than 70 since we decided Penry."
Id. Petitioner in the instant case had an IQ of fifty-nine. Id. at 309 & n.5.
37. Id. at 316.
38. See id. at 326 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 316 n.21 (majority opinion).
40. Id. (citing Brief of American Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (No. 00-8727);
Brief of the American Ass'n on Mental Retardation et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, McCarver, 532 U.S. 941 (No. 00-8727)). The Court focused on the
organizations' "official positions opposing the imposition of the death penalty upon a
mentally retarded offender." Id. The American Association on Mental Retardation's
Brief was referenced again when the Court cited the state and national polls included in
the brief's Appendix B to illustrate the Court's finding that "polling data shows a
widespread consensus among Americans . . . that executing the mentally retarded is
wrong." Id. at 317 n.21.
41. Id. at 316 n.21. The Court highlighted the diversity of religious beliefs
represented and noted that "even though their views about the death penalty differ, they
all 'share a conviction that the execution of persons with mental retardation cannot be
morally justified."' Id. (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of the United States Catholic
Conference et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2, McCarver, 532 U.S. 941 (No.00-8727)).
Note that the amicus briefs for McCarver, 532 U.S. 941, cert. dismissed as improvidently
granted, 533 U.S. 975 (2001), were transferred to the docket for Atkins. Atkins v. Virginia,
534 U.S. 1053 (2001) (mem.) (granting the motion of amicus filers in McCarver v. North
Carolina to have their amici curiae briefs considered in support of petitioner in this case).
42. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21 (citing European Union Brief, supra note 23, at 4).
43. See id. at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist reacted sharply." The Court's willingness "to
place weight on foreign laws, the views of professional and religious
organizations, and opinion polls in reaching its conclusion" troubled the
Chief Justice.4 ' Regarding the Court's application of foreign law, he
wrote that although "some of [the Court's] prior opinions have looked to
'the climate of international opinion,'... [the Court has] since explicitly
rejected the idea that the sentencing practices of other countries could
'serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that [a]
practice is accepted among our people.' 46 The Chief Justice stressed the
importance of evaluating the Eighth Amendment in terms of a national
47
consensus.
As biting as Chief Justice Rehnquist's assessment of the Court's work
was, Justice Scalia went further. After excoriating the Court for its
interpretation of data on state legislative action and statistics on the
"infrequency" with which mentally retarded individuals were executed,
Justice Scalia wrote that "the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to
fabricate 'national consensus' must go to its appeal (deservedly relegated
to a footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious
organizations, members of the so-called 'world community,' and
respondents to opinion polls."'as Citing his own dissent in a prior case,
Justice Scalia reiterated his view that the only relevant consensus for
49Eighth Amendment analysis is an American consensus.
44. The Chief Justice wrote that the Court's assessment of legislative judgment "more
resembles a post hoc rationalization for the majority's subjectively preferred result rather
than any objective effort to ascertain the content of an evolving standard of decency." Id.
at 322 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
45. Id. The Chief Justice stressed the importance of legislative determinations, as
well as those of sentencing juries, as the "sole indicators by which courts ascertain the
contemporary American conceptions of decency for purposes of the Eighth Amendment."
Id. at 324. He found consultation of other sources "antithetical to considerations of
federalism." Id. at 322.
46. Id. at 325 (final alteration in original) (citations omitted).
47. Id. ("For if it is evidence of a national consensus for which we are looking, then
the viewpoints of other countries simply are not relevant.").
48. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 348. Justice Scalia wrote in Atkins that "'[w]here there is not first a settled
consensus among our own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the
Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans through
the Constitution."' Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). In Thompson, the Court considered whether an individual who
committed a capital crime at the age of fifteen could be subject to the death penalty.
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-19. The majority in Thompson, in the process of finding that
"the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of a person who was
under 16 years of age at the time of his or her offense," id. at 838, referred to international
law, as presented to the Court in an amicus brief from Amnesty International, id. at 831
n.34.
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Ultimately, six Justices found substantial reason to hold that the
mentally retarded were exempt from the death penalty, ° while three
Justices preferred a more narrow inquiry into whether the Eighth
Amendment barred such application." Regardless of the outcome, one
cannot read this opinion without noticing the importance of the amicus
briefs and the prominent debate about foreign jurisprudence and
international social norms those briefs sparked.
C. Grutter v. Bollinger-A Logical End Point?
Grutter v. Bollinger,2 a case that drew 108 amicus filings,53 required the
Court to determine "whether the use of race as a factor in student
admissions by the University of Michigan Law School . . . [was]
unlawful., 54 The Court, per Justice O'Connor joined by four of her
colleagues, with two separate concurrences, ultimately upheld the law
school's admissions program.
55
Arriving at that conclusion required the Justices to revisit Regents of
University of California v. Bakke, where Justice Powell's opinion
elucidated the Court's holding that "a 'State has a substantial interest
that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic
origin.' 5 6 Based on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, Justice O'Connor
prefaced her analysis of the Michigan law school's admissions practices
by recalling that government-imposed racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny and therefore must be "narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests."57  With little elaboration, Justice
O'Connor announced that the Court would defer to the law school's
50. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. Justice Stevens wrote the majority's opinion and was
joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer. Id. at 305.
51. Id. at 324. The dissenters were Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas. Id. at 305.
52. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
53. There were seventy briefs filed in support of affirmance, id. at 311-13 n.*, twelve
briefs filed in support of reversal, id. at 310-11 n.*, and twenty-six briefs in support of
neither party, id. at 313-14 n.*.
54. Id. at 311.
55. Id. at 310, 343-44. The majority's precise finding was that "the Equal Protection
Clause does not prohibit the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions
decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body." Id. at 343.
56. Id. at 322-33 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320
(1978)). Justice O'Connor addressed Bakke only to make the point that Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke "approved the university's use of race to further only one interest: 'the
attainment of a diverse student body."' Id. at 323-25 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311).
57. Id. at 326.
[Vol. 55:267
Amicus Filings and International Law
educational judgment about the importance of diversity and on that basis
found the governmental interest to be compelling."
Citing the respondents' brief, Justice O'Connor distinguished the law
school's interest in and goal of obtaining a "critical mass" of minority
students from a straightforward quota, stating that if the law school's
approach were merely percentage-based, it would have been patently
unconstitutional. 9 Support for the "critical mass" model came from
several amici with diverse relationships to the case.60  These amici
stressed the importance of student body diversity, not only for its
academic benefits, but especially for its significance in preparing future
business professionals and the military officer corps.6 1
Continuing the Equal Protection analysis, Justice O'Connor evaluated
whether the law school's program was narrowly tailored. 62 Referencing
Justice Powell's Bakke opinion, she described a narrowly tailored use of
race in admissions as one that is flexible and ind. 63 Jracei  dmisios  i x d dividualized . ustice
O'Connor found that the law school's program was flexible and
individualized and bore the hallmarks of a narrowly tailored plan in
which race was "used in a flexible, nonmechanical way. ' 64 Additionally,
Justice O'Connor found that the law school's "critical mass" program
was not merely a disguised quota.6' Finally, she emphasized that "race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time., 66
58. Id. at 328.
59. Id. at 329-30 (citing Bakke, 435 U.S. at 307). The law school's goal was to "'enroll
a critical mass of minority students' ... not simply 'to assure ... some specified percentage
of a particular group."' Id. at 329 (citation omitted). This was a critical distinction
because the Court had previously held that "'[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its
own sake."' Id. at 330 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989)).
Unlike a quota, a "critical mass is defined by reference to the educational benefits that
diversity is designed to produce." Id.
60. Id. at 330-31 (citing briefs submitted by the American Educational Research
Association, 3M, General Motors, and Julius W. Becton, Jr.).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 333-34.
63. Id. at 334. Justice O'Connor's precise wording described a narrowly tailored use
of race in a university's admissions program as "'flexible enough to consider all pertinent
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place
them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the
same weight."' Id. (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 335-36 ("The Law School's goal of attaining a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students does not transform its program into a quota.").
66. Id. at 342. Without setting a deadline, Justice O'Connor suggested that the
"durational requirement can be met by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions
policies and. periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity." Id. She took the law school "at its word that it would...
terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as practicable." Id. at 343.
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In concurrence, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer seized upon the
importance of ending race-conscious programs once their purpose has
been accomplished, rather than simply determining whether such
programs are tolerable.67 The first paragraph of the concurrence cited
the "international understanding of the office of affirmative action."
61
The concurrence then cited The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which the United
States ratified in 1994.69 The Convention "endorses 'special and concrete
measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain
racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of
guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms."'7 The Justices did not cite an amicus brief for
the international law sources upon which they relied, but the brief of
Human Rights Advocates and the University of Minnesota Human
Rights Center advanced precisely the argument the concurring Justices
adopted.71 Perhaps these amici were simply targeting Justice Ginsburg's
conviction that "comparative analysis emphatically is relevant to the task
of interpreting constitutions and enforcing human rights.
72
Subsequent portions of this Comment address Justices' extrajudicial
statements on international law. For purposes of familiarity with the
Court's opinions in this case, it is sufficient to acknowledge that Justice
Ginsburg turned to international law in her concurrence, 73 and that amici
urged the Justices to do exactly that.74  Although the Court's use of
amicus filings is perhaps less apparent in Grutter than it was in Atkins,
67. See id. at 344-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
68. Id. at 344.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Annex to G.A. Res. 2106, 9 20, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Res. Supp.
(No. 14), p. 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014, Art. 2(2) (1965)).
71. Brief Amici Curiae Human Rights Advocates and the University of Minnesota
Human Rights Center in Support of Respondents at 16, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-
241, 02-516) [hereinafter Human Rights Advocates Brief] ("[A]s a means to ensure
compliance with ... treaty obligations, . . . courts ... should seek guidance from the Civil
and Political Covenant in interpreting United States laws. Similarly, courts could seek the
same interpretive guidance from Race Convention provisions. Failure to do so will
undermine the United States [sic] credibility as a State Party to these, as well as other
treaties.").
72. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An
International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282 (1999). Justice
Ginsburg elaborated by writing that "[w]e are the losers if we neglect what others can tell
us about endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other disadvantaged
groups." Id.
73. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
74. See, e.g., Human Rights Advocates Brief, supra note 71, at 16.
[Vol. 55:267
Amicus Filings and International Law
the Grutter docket was replete with amicus briefs, 75 and the briefs'
arguments appeared in the concurring Justices' opinion 76
D. Lawrence v. Texas-Dangerous Dicta?
In Lawrence v. Texas,77 the Court evaluated "the validity of a Texas
statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct."" The Court was presented with three
separate questions in its review: whether the Texas statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, whether conviction
under the Texas statute violated petitioners' "vital interests in liberty and
privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," and whether the Court should overrule Bowers v.
Hardwick.7 9 The Court did not address the first question, beginning its
analysis of the case by considering the Bowers question and the related
due process inquiry.'s
In Bowers, the Court framed the issue as whether there was a
fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy, and then said that
"[p]roscriptions against that conduct have ancient roots.' 'SX In
reevaluating the historical basis of the Bowers decision, the Lawrence
Court, per Justice Kennedy, twice cited the amicus brief of the American
Civil Liberties Union 82 en route to the conclusion that the "historical
grounds relied upon in Bowers... are not without doubt and, at the very
least, are overstated." 3 Justice Kennedy's opinion then cited a decision
of the European Court of Human Rights decided approximately five
years before Bowers, in which that court found that laws proscribing
consensual homosexual conduct were invalid under the European
Convention on Human Rights.84 Justice Kennedy went on to note that
the European precedent was binding on some forty-five nations, and "at
odds with the premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was
75. See supra note 53.
76. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344; Human Rights Advocates Brief, supra note 71, at 16.
77. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
78. Id. at 562. The Court noted that the statute defined the proscribed conduct as
"'(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of
another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with
an object."' Id. at 563 (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.01(1) (Vernon 2003)).
79. Id. at 564.
80. Id.
81. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S.
558.
82. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568, 570.
83. Id. at 571.
84. Id. at 573 (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 (1981)).
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. . . ,85insubstantial in our Western civilization." After describing the case as
one involving adults consenting to "sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle," the Court held that such individuals' "right to
liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage
in their conduct without intervention of the government.",
6
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, took a different
approach to resolving the issue; she based her opinion on the Equal
Protection Clause rather than the Due Process Clause because she did
not wish to join the Court in overruling Bowers.87 Justice O'Connor
noted that the Texas law "treat[ed] the same conduct differently based
solely on the participants, 's that it was "directed toward gay persons as a
class,"' 9 and that it affected an "array of areas outside the criminal law." 9
Justice O'Connor concluded that where the basis for a law is moral
disapproval of a class and its conduct, the law is contrary to the
Constitution.9
85. Id. By extension, Justice Kennedy found that "Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, . . . is not correct today[,] ... [and] ought not to remain binding precedent."
Id. at 578.
86. Id. at 578. Justice Kennedy also noted that "[o]ther nations.., have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct." Id. at 576 (citing Mary Robinson Brief, supra note 4, at 11-
12).
87. Id. at 579 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 581.
89. Id. at 583.
90. Id. at 584 (explaining that as a result of the law, "being homosexual carries the
presumption of being a criminal").
91. Id. at 585. Justice O'Connor wrote that "[a] law branding one class of persons as
criminal based solely on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct
associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal
Protection Clause, under any standard of review." Id. Justice O'Connor also noted that
"Texas [could not] assert any legitimate state interest ... such as national security or
preserving the traditional institution of marriage." Id. It seems that in so doing, Justice
O'Connor left open the issue of whether laws proscribing homosexual marriage might
survive an Equal Protection challenge. This question became particularly important
during the 2004 elections:
Proposed state constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage .. .
defin[ing] marriage as between only a man and a woman, passed overwhelmingly
in . . . 11 states, clearly receiving support from Democrats and independents as
well as Republicans. Only in Oregon and Michigan did the amendment receive
less than 60 percent of the vote.
James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2004, at P4. See generally M. Isabel Medina, Of Constitutional Amendments, Human
Rights, and Same-Sex Marriages, 64 LA. L. REV. 459 (2004).
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In dissent, Justice Scalia criticized the Court for failing to perform the
92
correct due process analysis . He found that, as a result of this failure,
the Court overruled Bowers without addressing its central legal
conclusion, an outcome that Justice Scalia found inconsistent with the
notion of stare decisis. 93 Justice Scalia's criticism consisted of restating
the requirements for the recognition of a fundamental right or a
constitutional entitlement.94  Going further, Justice Scalia argued that
constitutional entitlements certainly do not "spring into existence, as the
Court seems to believe, because foreign nations decriminalize conduct." 95
Justice Scalia concluded that "It]he Court's discussion of these foreign
views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained
criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is therefore meaningless dicta.
Dangerous dicta, however, since 'this Court . . . should not impose
foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.
' '
,
96
The Lawrence decision, like others before it, featured prominent filing
and use of amicus briefs, a divided Court, and reference to and criticism
of the reference to international law.97 It is a good starting point for this
Comment's advancement of a typology of amicus briefs involving
international law, and the application of international law in several
amicus briefs whose arguments apparently persuaded the Court, and thus
were persuasive policy advocacy pieces.
III. AMicus BRIEFS FROM SIGNIFICANT SUPREME COURT CASES: A
CATEGORIZATION AND ANALYSIS
This segment of the Comment evaluates the various types of amicus
briefs submitted to the Court. The first step in this analysis is to explore
92. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[N]owhere does the Court's
opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process
Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be
appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a 'fundamental right."').
93. Id. at 586-87.
94. Id. at 593-98. Justice Scalia wrote that "an 'emerging awareness' is by definition
not 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[s],' as [the Court has] said
'fundamental right' status requires." Id. at 598 (first alteration in original). Justice Scalia
extended his concept of a fundamental right by stating that "[c]onstitutional entitlements
do not spring into existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal
sanctions." Id.
95. Id. at 598.
96. Id. (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n. (2002) (alteration in original)).
Justice Scalia concluded his dissent by commenting that "the Court has taken sides in the
culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic
rules of engagement are observed." Id. at 602. He also discussed the "homosexual
agenda," the role of the judiciary, and homosexual marriage, among other topics. Id. at
602-05.
97. See, e.g., id. at 576-77.
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the categorization of several different types of briefs. Thereafter, this
Comment will consider the briefs submitted in the cases discussed above
in light of the briefs' categorization.
A. Types of Briefs
Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court Counsel of the National Association
of Attorneys General, has identified nine types of amicus briefs, four of
which are relevant to this Comment's analysis: the "practical
implications" brief, the "different legal argument" brief, the "amplify one
issue" brief, and the "historical background" brief.
98
Schweitzer describes the "practical implications" brief as one that
"illuminate[s] the real-world consequences of the case." 99 The "different
legal argument" brief alerts the Court to a legal argument other than
those made by the parties.'0 The "amplify one issue" brief is one that
extends an argument already advanced by one of the parties.'' Finally,
in the "historical background" brief the amicus expounds upon the
"historical roots of the law or practice under review."' 2 Of course, not
every amicus brief limits itself to one type of content, but rather might
strengthen its argument by utilizing different types of reasoning. After
all, the purpose of the amicus brief is to bring relevant material to the
attention of the Court, and the amicus developing an argument based on
international law may find several ways to articulate its policy concerns.10
The next step in this Comment's analysis is to evaluate how the
successful, which is to say, cited, briefs in the cases discussed above fit
into this typology and whether one type of brief is a better fit than others
for a particular type of case.
B. Atkins and Amplification
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Court cited the amicus brief of the European
Union for its illustration of evolving standards of decency regarding the
execution of the mentally retarded.'0" That brief's argument reflects the
European Union's belief that "[tihere is growing international consensus
98. Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 531-538.
99. Id. at 531-32. Schweitzer also characterizes this type of brief as a "Brandeis"
brief, in reference to a brief filed by Louis Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908). Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 532. This brief may acquaint the Court with "more
detailed information than the party and.., reference a wider variety of sources." Id.
100. Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 534.
101. Id. at 535.
102. Id. at 536.
103. See id. at 531.
104. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17, 317 n.21 (2002); Schweitzer, supra note
10, at 536.
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against the execution of persons with mental retardation."'0'5 The first
part of the European Union's argument describes the worldwide status
of the death penalty generally, as well as its scarce application to the
mentally retarded specifically. The second part of the argument
describes the "body of norms and standards that prohibit the execution
of the mentally retarded.' 1 7  The brief concludes with a strong
condemnation of the United States' policy regarding the death penalty
and the reminder that "the United States is also a member of the
community of nations, and with regard to the execution of mentally
retarded defendants, the United States stands apart from that community
as one of the last remaining nations ... still executing mentally retarded
persons."' 8 This reminder underscores the brief's implicit argument that
the practices of the international community are relevant to the Eighth
Amendment inquiry into "evolving standards of decency."'
' 9
The European Union's brief functions as issue amplification; Atkins's
brief mentioned only that "on the world-wide stage, the few jurisdictions
in the United States that continue to execute mentally retarded persons
now stand all but alone.""0  In addition to amplifying the evolving
standards issue, the European Union's brief provided a historical
description of international efforts to accord legal protections to the
mentally retarded, as well as a description of the history of international
censure of the American practice of executing the mentally retarded."'
It is reasonable to categorize this brief as a historical background brief
105. European Union Brief, supra note 23, at 2. Evidence of this proposition lies in
the statement that "since 1995 only three countries in the world are reported to have
carried out executions of mentally retarded defendants." Id.
106. Id. at 10-15. The brief cites the Treaty of Amsterdam, which is binding on all the
E.U. member states. Id. at 11. Ratification of the treaty is required for states joining the
European Union, and includes "a declaration stating that the death penalty is no longer
applied in any EU member state." Id. Additionally, forty-three states in Europe,
including those of the European Union, have joined the Council of Europe, where
"[m]embership . . . is conditioned upon abolition of or a moratorium on the death
penalty." Id. at 11-12. Moreover, "in a 2001 report of the Secretary General of the United
Nations, only Togo reported that its law would allow the death sentence to be imposed on
persons who are mentally retarded." Id. at 12 (citing United Nations Commission on
Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Report of the Secretary-General, Capital
Punishment and Implementation of Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing
the Death Penalty, T 105 U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/2001/10 (2001)).
107. Id. at 16. European Union Brief, supra note 23, at 11. The norms cited are
distilled from the actions and policy of the United Nations and other bodies, such as the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Organization of American
States. Id. at 16-18.
108. Id. at 22.
109. Id. at 22-23.
110. Brief for Petitioner at 40, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452).
111. European Union Brief, supra note 23, at 10-13, 18-22.
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because of its explanation of the development of rules on the mentally
retarded.' 2 The brief also explained the ongoing forms of censure to
which the United States was subject in various international
organizations as a result of allowing the execution of the mentally
retarded.1 3 Thus the brief has a practical implications emphasis insofar
as it describes the consequence, namely the continuing disapproval of
other nations, of maintaining the status quo.1 4  This multifaceted
approach apparently served the amicus's purpose well.
The European Union's statement of interest is noteworthy; it shows
that the E.U. is opposed to the death penalty generally, not merely in the
context of the mentally retarded: "The abolition of the death penalty
contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and the progressive
development of human rights.""..5  The European Union continues to
work toward abolition of the death penalty, both at home, through the
European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and in the United States,
through its amicus filings in this and other death penalty cases.116
112. See Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 536.
113. European Union Brief, supra note 23, at 19-22.
114. See Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 531-32.
An assessment of the relationship between Europe and the United States, and the
importance of their historical bonds and political future, was made by Helmut Schmidt,
former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, in a 2003 address at the German
Historical Institute in Washington, D.C. Schmidt's remarks, though politically focused,
also serve as a justification for American courts' use of European practice to clarify
American Constitutional questions. Schmidt said that:
Good neighborly relations and cooperation between America and Europe
need to be maintained. Whether American or European, we stand upon the
shoulders of common ancestors such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Voltaire,
and all of us follow in the footsteps of the American Federalist Papers. The basic
principles of democracy and human rights were created in America, England,
Holland, France, and other European countries as the result of mutual
collaboration. It was a long process that evolved slowly .... Both Europeans
and Americans have inherited the same enormous wealth of insights into culture
and civilization. It is desirable to remind the public of our common roots.
Helmut Schmidt, Former Chancellor, F.R.G., The Global Situation: A European Point of
View, Fourth Gerd Bucerius Lecture (Sept. 17, 2003), in BULL. GERMAN HIST. INST.,
Spring 2004, at 9, 24.
115. European Union Brief, supra note 23, at 1. It should not escape notice, as
evidence of the policy-driven nature of this amicus filing, that the petitioner's name
appeared only in the case captions within the brief; neither the petitioner's name nor
specific details of his case appeared at any other point in the European Union Brief. See
id.
116. European Commission, Charter of Fundamental Rights (Dec. 7, 2000),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice-home/unit/charte/en/charter.html. The European
Charter of Fundamental Rights was announced by the European Council, the European
Parliament, and the European Commission in December of 2000, but has not yet become
binding upon E.U. member states. European Commission Charter of Fundamental
Rights, Frequently Asked Questions, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice-home/unit/charte/
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C. Grutter v. Bollinger and Applicable Treaty Standards
In a jointly filed brief, Human Rights Advocates and the University of
Minnesota Human Rights Center stressed that prohibiting the University
of Michigan's Law School from considering diversity factors would be
"contrary to the United States' treaty obligations which are ... part of
the Law of the Land under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. 1. 7  The amici argued that, as signatory to both the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Race Convention) and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, it was imperative that the United States follow
its treaty obligations.' According to the Race Convention, special
treatment of minorities is acceptable for the narrow purpose of "securing
adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups . ..requiring
such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups...
equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights or fundamental
freedoms."" 9 After citing Supreme Court precedent endorsing a race-
based preference program as a remedy for discrimination, the amici
stated flatly that "[a] prohibition of affirmative action programs will
directly conflict with the obligation of the United States as a party to the
Race Convention.' ', 20 Amici concluded their brief by arguing that "as a
means to ensure compliance with the treaty obligations, the courts of this
country should seek guidance" from such treaties when interpreting
United States laws.12 ' Perhaps more important to these amici, the broad
goal of eradicating gender and racial discrimination, embodied in treaty
law to which the United States is a party, is advanced by the Court's
consideration of those treaties.
2 2
The Human Rights Advocates amicus brief, like the European Union
brief described above, involved several different types of arguments or
constructions. In large part, the brief argued the practical implications of
en/faqs.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). With respect to the death penalty, the Charter
provides that "[n]o one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed." Charter of
Fundamental Rights, supra, art. 2 para. 2. The Charter also provides that "[n]o one may
be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she
would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." Id. at art. 19, para. 2.
117. Human Rights Advocates Brief, supra note 71, at 2-3.
118. Id. at 3-4.
119. Id. at 6 (quoting International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination art. 1(4), opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195).
120. Id. at 10. Amici also advanced the argument, regarding affirmative action
programs, that "treaty obligations themselves can constitute a compelling state interest to
justify the establishment of such programs." Id. at 9.
121. Id. at 16.
122. Id. at 15-16.
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treaty law to which the United States is party. It also made a different
legal argument than the parties made; the respondents relied on wholly
separate arguments in their brief, entirely passing over treaty law.1 4 In
this case, the amicus's focus on a different argument and source of law
seems to have been prescient and helpful; elements of the amicus filing
appear tacitly in the opinion of the concurring Justices, and the principle
of affirmative action was reaffirmed and harmonized with equal
protection concerns.125
D. Lawrence v. Texas: The Promotion of Freedom Worldwide?
Lawrence v. Texas"' saw the filing of numerous amicus briefs on both
sides, ' but one in support of the petitioners is noteworthy for the
identity its filers and its usage of international law. Mary Robinson,
former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and
former President of the Republic of Ireland, joined five human rights
advocacy organizations to argue that the Supreme Court "should not
decide in a vacuum whether criminalization of same-sex sodomy between
consenting adults violates constitutional guarantees of privacy and equal
protection.' ' 28  The amici reminded the Court of "Chief Justice
123. See id. at 10.
124. See id.; Brief for Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241). The respondents' brief argued that the diversity goal of the law school was a
compelling state interest in and of itself, and that the law school's admissions policies were
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal. Id. at 12. The respondents' brief focused on
American precedent as well as the facts presented in the prior litigation of the case. See
id. at 17-21, 38-49.
125. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343; id. at 344-45 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
127. Id. at 561 n.*.
128. Mary Robinson Brief, supra note 4, at 2. The other amici describe themselves as
follows:
Amnesty International is an international human rights organization
established in 1961 to promote a world in which every person enjoys the human
rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights....
Human Rights Watch, the largest U.S.-based international human rights
organization, was established in 1978 to report on violations of human rights
worldwide.
Interights, a London-based international human rights organization, was
established in 1982 to provide leadership in the legal protection of human rights
worldwide.
The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, based in New York City, has
worked since 1978 in the United States and abroad to create a secure and
humane world by advancing justice, dignity, and'respect for the rule of law.
Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, founded in 1983, is the largest
Midwest-based non-governmental organization engaged in international human
rights work.
Id. at 1.
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Rehnquist's 1989 admonition that 'now that constitutional law is solidly
grounded in so many [foreign] countries, it is time that the United States
courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid
in their own deliberative process..' 129 With the Chief Justice's remarks as
a foundation, the amici stressed that "[l]egal concepts like 'privacy,'
'liberty,' and 'equality' are not U.S. property, but have global
meaning. ,,13
The amici recited three theories of privacy the Texas statute violated:
decisional privacy, relational privacy, and zonal privacy. 3 ' Each of these
theories of privacy had been used in the decisions or policies of foreign
tribunals or international organizations to protect the privacy rights of
On the significance of collaboration in filing, see Lynch, supra note 23, at 56-65. The
former Supreme Court clerks Lynch surveyed expressed general favor for collaboration
on amicus filings, but some also noted that collaboration might cause the ultimate filing to
be "'stripped down"' and fail to reflect the details of each separate party's favored
arguments. Id. at 59-60. The results of Lynch's survey also suggest that the names of the
collaborators, and not their number, would draw more attention. Id. at 61.
129. Mary Robinson Brief, supra note 4, at 5-6 (quoting William H. Rehnquist,
Constitutional Courts-Comparative Remarks (1989), in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAW:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE-A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 412 (Paul Kirchhof
& Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)). The Chief
Justice explained:
When many new constitutional courts were created after the Second World War,
these courts naturally looked to decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, among other sources, for developing their own law. But now that
constitutional law is solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the
United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts
to aid in their own deliberative process.
Id. at 6 n.7.
130. Id. at 8. The amici then stated that the "Court can use the experience of nations
that share its common constitutional genealogy as laboratories to test workable social
solutions to our common constitutional problems." Id. The concept of using states as
laboratories arose in Justice Brandeis' dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), when he argued that states in this nation could
serve as such laboratories, id. Justice Breyer specifically introduced the concept of using
other nations' experiences for empirical guidance when he wrote of several European
countries that "their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem-in this case the problem
of reconciling central authority with the need to preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy
of a smaller constituent governmental entity." Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977
(1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
131. Mary Robinson Brief, supra note 4, at 9-18. The amici describe decisional privacy
in terms of "the most intimate and personal choices a person can make ... choices central
to personal dignity and autonomy." Id. at 9 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). Relational privacy deals with the nature of family
relationships, and the amici contended that same-sex couples could form relationships
akin to traditional notions of family. Id. at 14-15. Zonal privacy regards the Court's
"heightened protection to activities that occur within the home." Id. at 15.
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same-sex couples. 132 The amici concluded their brief with the argument
that "international and foreign court decisions have invalidated sodomy
laws for expressing an irrational animus and prejudice that denies a
politically unpopular group equal treatment."'33 This argument had two
components: (1) Sodomy laws are based in "irrational animus and
prejudice[; and (2)] impermissible discrimination based on sexual
orientation" results from such laws. 34 Both components of the argument
had been shown by international and foreign law to violate "fundamental
global principles of equal treatment.'
135
The Mary Robinson brief fits into several categories. First, it makes
copious historical references to decisions of foreign courts and
international bodies, drawing attention to the parallels to American
decisions.16  It also makes a different legal argument from the
petitioner's brief; the petitioner made no reference to international law
or foreign law as a justification for either a fundamental rights-based or
equal protection challenge to the Texas statute. 37 The decision in this
case depended not on the equal protection grounds the Mary Robinson
brief advanced, but on a kind of fundamental rights model; only Justice
O'Connor relied on the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate the Texas
statute.138 Nevertheless, the amici's policy interests were advanced by the
132. Id. at 8-18.
133. Id. at 18. This argument borrowed the wording of the Supreme Court's decision
in Romer v. Evans, in which the Court "struck down a Colorado constitutional
amendment forbidding legal protection of sexual conduct between same-sex partners, in
part because the law 'impos[ed] a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group."' Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)). The Mary Robinson
Brief also referenced Justice Scalia's dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma, in which he wrote
about a practice "so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place not
merely in our mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well." Id. at 7-8 (quoting
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The brief's
linkage of international materials to the language of prior American cases reinforces the
amici's contention that international law is compatible with the Supreme Court's way of
making decisions. See id. at 29-30.
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id. at 18-29. The point of the argument is that
[vlirtually every international human rights treaty and every democratic
country's constitution contain provisions guaranteeing the right to equal
protection of the laws. Since the 1970s, international and foreign courts have
increasingly come to recognize that these provisions bar discrimination based not
only on race, sex, and religion, but sexual orientation as well. In addition, both
international courts and treaty bodies have ruled that various treaties' equal
protection provisions cover sexual-orientation discrimination.
Id. at 23.
136. Id. at 3-8, 18-29.
137. See id. at 2; Brief of Petitioner, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-
102).
138. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79; id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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decision, and a strong equal protection argument for same-sex rights may
be germane to later cases.
IV. "QUESTIONS OF RIGHT"
The remainder of this Comment addresses how the potential amicus,
as a policy advocate, can attempt to guide the Court's reasoning and
whether it is appropriate for the Court to allow the policy arguments of
non-parties to influence its decisions.
A. Evolving Standards
Michael Ramsey counsels that the consideration and application of
international law by the Supreme Court be rigorous and careful.3 9
Arguably, the threshold for such consideration, or at least Ramsey's first
suggested criterion for rigorous application of international law, is
careful articulation of a theory as to which materials to utilize and how to
use them. 40 By articulating such a theory at the outset, amici and the
Court prevent the use of international materials to achieve selective
outcomes, or the use of international materials solely for rights-
enhancing results.'41  Like the articulation of a theory of relevance,
careful attention to all the facts ensures that the application of
international law does not impede careful inquiry into all potentially
relevant sources of information, 41 which, by extension, might lead one to
a false conclusion of "consensus.'
'143
Ramsey's argument is persuasive only to the extent one accepts its
foundations: that international law must involve "sustained widespread
custom followed out of a sense of legal obligation"; that the only
legitimate means of interpreting the Constitution have "longstanding
roots"; and that the Supreme Court's mode of adjudication must always
involve a "unifying theory" with respect to the materials it does
consult. ' Where, as in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a
challenged practice is measured against "evolving standards of decency,"
it is counterproductive for the Court to restrict itself to outdated and
unavailing methods of decisionmaking. While longstanding roots are
certainly evidence of pedigree, perhaps "new understandings of
sovereignty and popular sovereignty" rightly encourage the court to
139. See Ramsey, supra note 19, at 69-70.
140. Id. at 72.
141. Id. at 76.
142. See id. at 77-79.
143. See id. at 79-80.
144. See id. at 71-72.
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consider different arguments from different sources.1 45 When American
history or precedent is silent or inconclusive the Court does not deny
certiorari simply because the case is not readily solved by extant
domestic means. The unifying theory that allows consideration of
international materials alongside traditional, domestic materials, is the
belief that international law, in all its manifestations, is or can be part of
our law.
146
B. Amicus Advocacy
While a rigorous and principled application of international law is
desirable, one cannot forget that the role of the amicus curiae is to bring
relevant matters to the attention of the Court. 47 There are two levels of
148
relevance: matters relevant to the policy interests of the amicus, and
149
matters the Court deems relevant to the outcome of a given case.
145. Aleinikoff, supra note 16, at 91. Aleinikoff suggests (with considerable
refinement) that Congress provide for challenges to "federal statutes and executive branch
actions that violate [customary international law]." Id. at 101. Such an action would
reflect a move to embrace the international norms "hammered out through more than two
centuries of debate, adjudication, and at times force of arms-[that] strike the appropriate
balance between rights and governmental powers in the domestic sphere." Id.
146. See Koh, supra note 12, at 43 & n.1. Constitutional jurisprudence has developed
over time in a variety of ways, as highlighted by Stanley Katz, a Lecturer at the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Stanley N.
Katz, A New American Dilemma?: U.S. Constitutionalism vs. International Human Rights,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 323, 338 (2003). He wrote that
[c]onstitutional practice changes, and with it the way the republic governs itself
must change. There is no logical reason American constitutional tradition could
not embrace international human rights ideals-no built-in structural resistance
exists. But in fact, the tradition has failed us when it comes to human rights.
Thus, I simply want to suggest that our textualism is a sort of anchor to
windward, inhibiting innovation, especially when constitutional changes trigger
atavistic political responses. Textualism impels us to question, and sometimes to
challenge, innovations that might otherwise be much easier to accept. The
textualist tradition is more instinctive than rational, and makes it very hard to
gain constitutional acceptance for ideas and practices that are rooted neither in
the text nor found in our lived traditions. Insofar as human rights are concerned,
textualism interacts with both Washingtonian fears of "foreign entanglement"
and Anti-Federalist resistance to the aggrandizement of the government in
Washington at the time of the Constitution's ratification.
Id. at 338-39.
147. Sup. CT. R. 37.
148. See Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 531.
149. See Lynch, supra note 23, at 36; Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 531. Emphasizing
the importance of and difficulties associated with writing to a particular judge or bench,
one author wrote that "[1]ike other litigators, civil rights groups advocates look at judges,
and assess what they will find persuasive. International law has not fit that criteria.
Indeed, some litigators have been concerned that citations to international law would
signal an essential weakness in their case under domestic law." Martha S. Davis,
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Each amicus who files a brief ought to consider the policy it seeks to
advance and then determine which international materials best serve that
goal.'50 In presenting those materials, overstatement is tempting, but
avoidable. Consider the Mary Robinson brief discussed above. Rather
than simply stating that a global consensus or universal movement exists
regarding the right of same-sex couples to engage in sodomy, the amici
stated that "[o]ther nations with similar histories, legal systems, and
political cultures have already answered these questions in the
affirmative., 151 Similarly, in the European Union brief discussed above,
the amicus, though referencing some United Nations sources of a less
persuasive nature,"' also wrote emphatically and extensively about the
European Union and its member states, the Council of Europe and its
member states, and jurisdictions in the Western Hemisphere generally.'5 3
Determining the ultimate relevance of international materials is the
Court's province and depends upon the nature of the case. Where
"evolving standards of decency" are at issue, international materials from
jurisdictions most like the United States have helped the Court, as
Justice Blackmun suggested they should.14  Where equal protection
International Human Rights and United States Law, Predictions of a Courtwatcher, 64 ALB.
L. REV. 417, 418 (2000).
150. See Ramsey, supra note 19, at 72-73. One organization that has been particularly
successful at using international law in domestic courts is the Center for Constitutional
Rights (CCR), based in New York. CCR is
a non-profit legal and educational organization dedicated to protecting and
advancing the rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
CCR uses litigation proactively to advance the law in a positive direction, to
empower poor communities and communities of color, to guarantee the rights of
those with the fewest protections and least access to legal resources, to train the
next generation of constitutional and human rights attorneys, and to strengthen
the broader movement for constitutional and human rights.
CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, ABOUT CCR, http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/about/
missionvision.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2005). CCR pioneered human rights advocacy
using the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA, also known as the "Alien Tort Statute"): "[in
1980, our Fildrtiga v. Peha-Irala [case] created a right to sue for human rights violations
occurring anywhere in the world under the then-obscure Alien Tort Claims Act." See id.
For more on the ATCA, including the Supreme Court's most recent opinion regarding its
scope and uses, see infra note 165.
151. Mary Robinson Brief, supra note 4, at 2.
152. See Ramsey, supra note 19, at 78 (criticizing the European Union's Brief's
reliance on a U.N. study that depended on voluntary responses because most respondents
did not allow the death penalty for anyone, and because the study's authors did not
undertake any independent investigations).
153. European Union Brief, supra note 23, at 5-8.
154. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J.
39, 48 (1994). The reason was plain to Justice Blackmun, who wrote that "[i]f the
substance of the Eighth Amendment is to turn on the 'evolving standards of decency' of
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the civilized world, there can be no justification for limiting judicial inquiry to the opinions
of the United States." Id.
The debate about use of international sources in Eighth Amendment decisionmaking
played itself out among the Justices in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989),
overruled in part by Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005). For a discussion of Roper,
see infra note 165. In Stanford, the issue was whether "imposition of the death penalty on
those who were juveniles when they committed their crimes falls within the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishments."' Stanford, 492 U.S. at
368. Amici had briefed the Court on the international law bases for concluding that
juveniles should not be subject to the death penalty. E.g., Brief of the Office of the
Capital Collateral Representative for the State of Florida as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 19, Stanford, 492 U.S. 368 (No. 87-5765), 1988 WL 1026340. In an opinion
announcing the Court's judgment, Justice Scalia tersely stated that
it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the
contention of petitioners and their various amici (accepted by the dissent) that
the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant. While "[t]he practices of
other nations, particularly other democracies, can be relevant to determining
whether a practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident,
but rather so 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' that it occupies a place
not merely in our mores, but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well," they
cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the
practice is accepted among our people.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
In his dissent, Justice Brennan wrote that
[o]ur judgment about the constitutionality of a punishment under the Eighth
Amendment is informed, though not determined, by an examination of
contemporary attitudes toward the punishment, as evidenced in the actions of
legislatures and of juries. The views of organizations with expertise in relevant
fields and the choices of governments elsewhere in the world also merit our
attention as indicators whether a punishment is acceptable in a civilized society.
Id. at 383-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan regarded the
weight of international practice against execution of juveniles as substantial, repeatedly
citing an amicus brief from Amnesty International, as well as treaty law the United States
had signed or ratified:
Many countries, of course-over 50, including nearly all in Western Europe-
have formally abolished the death penalty, or have limited its use to exceptional
crimes such as treason. Twenty-seven others do not in practice impose the
penalty. Of the nations that retain capital punishment, a majority-65-prohibit
the execution of juveniles. Sixty-one countries retain capital punishment and
have no statutory provision exempting juveniles, though some of these nations
are ratifiers of international treaties that do prohibit the execution of juveniles.
Since 1979, Amnesty International has recorded only eight executions of
offenders under 18 throughout the world, three of these in the United States.
The other five executions were carried out in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and
Barbados. In addition to national laws, three leading human rights treaties
ratified or signed by the United States explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties.
Within the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for juvenile
crimes appears to be overwhelmingly disapproved.
Id. at 389-90 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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concerns are implicated, the Court has been unwilling to cite
international sources, 55 but at least one Justice has recognized the
importance of America's international heritage and the history of
countries that inform its legal system.1 6  The current formulation of
fundamental rights jurisprudence may not easily lend itself to
incorporation of foreign concepts,"57 but there may nevertheless be
reason to look to the history and practice of other jurisdictions and
analyze their concepts of fundamental rights, particularly if doing so
evidences a strong consistency or contrast between the United States and
other similar countries. 5 8 The amicus who can incorporate references to
155. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (deciding, without reference to
international law, that a portion of Colorado's Constitution was unconstitutional for
violating the Equal Protection Clause by "classif[ying] homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else").
156. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
("The safeguards of 'due process of law' and 'the equal protection of the laws' summarize
the history of freedom of English-speaking peoples running back to Magna Carta and
reflected in the constitutional development of our people.").
157. See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). One of the major
difficulties in applying international law to a fundamental rights question is the method by
which the Court analyzes such a question:
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary
features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially
protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed." Second, we have required in substantive-due-process cases a "careful
description" of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Our Nation's history,
legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial "guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking," that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause. As we stated recently in Flores, the Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the
government to infringe . . . 'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what
process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest."
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
158. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
Harlan offered a more theoretical analysis of due process:
Due process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be
determined by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through
the course of this Court's decisions it has represented the balance which our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has
struck between that liberty and the demands of organized society. If the
supplying of content to this Constitutional concept has of necessity been a
rational process, it certainly has not been one where judges have felt free to roam
where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I speak is
the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.
That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court which radically departs
from it could not long survive, while a decision which builds on what has survived
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treaties the United States has ratified might be in the best position of all
because, subject to reservations entered by the Senate upon ratification,
a ratified treaty is true international law, binding upon the United States
through the Supremacy Clause.' 9
The true test of relevance is in each Justice's decision, and, for that
reason, the Court is right to accept policy suggestions from its amici. The
amicus process presents a forum for the expression of beliefs and
arguments on all sides of an issue; strident defenders of traditional
is likely to be sound. No formula could serve as a substitute, in this area, for
judgment and restraint.
It is this outlook which has led the Court continuingly to perceive
distinctions in the imperative character of Constitutional provisions, since that
character must be discerned from a particular provision's larger context. And
inasmuch as this context is one not of words, but of history and purposes, the full
scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms
of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to
keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and
so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, and which
also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgment.
Id. (citations omitted).
In contrast, one scholar defines a fundamental right, in the broadest sense of that term,
in terms of its features.
Fundamental rights protected by positive legal regimes commonly exhibit three
features. First, their embodiment in positive law gives their enforcement a
legitimating basis in political consent. Second, their normative power does not
derive solely from their enactment as positive law. Third, as legal rules they
operate in an institutional context. These aspects not only characterize
fundamental rights, but also exert influence on their interpretation.
Gerald L. Neuman, Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1866 (2003).
159. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae
in the case of Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005), an equal protection challenge
to California's policy of segregating prisoners by race for the first sixty days of
incarceration, relied on the United States' treaty obligations in its brief. Id. at 1144; Brief
of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union et al. in Support of Petitioner at 10 n.2,
Johnson, 125 S.Ct. 1141 (No. 03-636), 2004 WL 1248855.
The American Civil Liberties Union emphasized that
[t]he application of the most exacting scrutiny to state-imposed racial segregation
is also consistent with this nation's obligations under the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination which
provides, "States Parties particularly condemn racial segregation and apartheid
and undertake to prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of this nature in
territories under their jurisdiction." The United States ratified the Convention in
1994.
Id. (citations omitted).
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jurisprudence are amici just as much as progressives advocating that the
United States import practices from abroad."6  It is for the Justices,
individually and as a bench, to determine which arguments are
persuasive and which arguments should not be countenanced.'6
160. For example, Schweitzer has identified a "surprising source" brief as one that is
powerful "because [it is] written by entities that one would expect to be supporting the
other side of this case." Schweitzer, supra note 10, at 534. Perhaps an adaptation of this
"surprising source" classification would be the use of international law in an amicus filing
from an amicus who would not be expected to rely on international law to advance its
arguments, such as the Heritage Foundation or the Christian Coalition.
161. Several Supreme Court Justices have endorsed looking abroad for guidance.
Justice Blackmun wrote that "[i]nternational law can and should inform the interpretation
of various clauses of the Constitution, notably the Due Process Clause and the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments." Blackmun, supra note
154, at 45. Justice Breyer has also spoken on the utility of comparative jurisprudence,
including his observations that
some of my colleagues believe that comparative analysis is "inappropriate to the
task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of course quite relevant to the
task of writing one." But comparative use of foreign constitutional decisions will
not lead us blindly to follow the foreign court. As I have said before-"we are
interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other nations, and there may be
relevant political and structural differences between their systems and our own.
But their experience may nonetheless cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem .... ."
Ultimately, I believe the "comparativist" view that several of us have enunciated
will carry the day-simply because of the enormous value in any discipline of
trying to learn from the similar experience of others.
Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law Annual
Meeting, in 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265,266 (2003).
Similarly, Justice O'Connor has asked
why does information about international law matter so much? Why should
judges and lawyers who are concerned about the intricacies of ERISA, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Bankruptcy Code care about issues of
foreign law and international law? The reason, of course, is globalization. No
institution of government can afford now to ignore the rest of the world.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address at the American Society of International Law
Annual Meeting, in 96 AM SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348, 349 (2002). Justice O'Connor, in
remarks at Georgetown Law Center, said that
[ilnternational law, which is the expression of agreement on some basic
principles of relations between nations, will be a factor or a force in gaining a
greater consensus among all nations concerning some basic principles of their
relations with one another. It can be and it is a help in our search for a more
peaceful world.
Acting in accord with international norms may increase the chances for
development of broader alliances or at least silence [sic] support from other
nations.
Sandra Day O'Connor, Supreme Court Associate Justice Remarks at a Dedication
Ceremony of the Eric Hotung International Law Center Building at Georgetown
University (Oct. 27, 2004). Justice O'Connor's statement implicates at least two reasons to
consider international law in domestic contexts. The first is her reference to international
law as a tool to govern the relations between nations; the second is her acknowledgement
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C. The Next Steps
Since the cases described above, the Supreme Court's docket has
continued to include cases inviting amicus submission. At least three
amici filed briefs outlining the international basis for prohibiting the
death penalty under certain circumstances in Roper v. Simmons, a case
challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty for individuals who
were under the age of eighteen when they committed capital crimes. In
that "acting in accord with international norms" might have some political utility for the
United States in its relations with other countries. See id.
The expressed opinions of Justices Rehnquist, see supra note 129, Ginsburg, see supra
note 72, Breyer, see supra, and O'Connor, see supra, beg the question of how, or whether,
the Court will apply international sources to constitutional questions not directly
implicating international law once the composition of the bench changes.
162. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1187 (2005); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
President James Earl Carter, Jr. et al. in Support of Respondents at 2, Roper, 125 S.Ct.
1183 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636446; Brief of Amici Curiae Former U.S. Diplomats
Morton Abramowitz et al., Roper, 124 S.Ct. 1183 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1636448; Brief of
Amici Curiae the European Union et al., Roper, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL
1619203. Note that the European Union is joined by Canada, the Council of Europe,
Iceland, Lichtenstein, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland in its brief in
Roper. Id. at 3.
At oral argument in Roper, Justice Kennedy pointed out to petitioner's counsel that
there was
very substantial demonstration that world opinion is-is against this, at least as
interpreted by the leaders of the European Union. Does that have a bearing on
what's unusual? Suppose it were shown that the United States was one of the
very, very few countries that executed juveniles, and that's true. Does that have
a bearing on whether or not it's unusual?
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Roper, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 2387647.
Petitioner's counsel replied that "[tihe decision as to Eighth Amendment should not be
based on what happens in the rest of the world. It needs to be based on the mores of -of
American society." Id.
Respondent's counsel, while discussing the Eighth Amendment's "evolving standards
of decency" jurisprudence, argued that
this is a standard ... that looks to evolving standards of moral decency that go to
human dignity. And in that regard, it is . . . notable that we are literally alone in
the world even though 110 countries in the world permit capital punishment for
one .. crime or another, and yet every one-every one formally renounces it for
juvenile offenders.
Id. at 28.
Ultimately, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not permit the imposition
of the death penalty on individuals who were under eighteen-years-old at the time they
committed an otherwise capital crime. Roper, 125 S.Ct. at 1194. The final section of
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court described the "stark reality that the United States
is the only country in the world that continue[d] to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty." Id. at 1198. Justice Kennedy acknowledged the delicacy of applying
international law by observing that "[t]he opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
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Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,6 international law played an extensive role in
the briefing, I not least because the case involved the Alien Tort Statute,
a much debated grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts for "any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States., 165 And in Republic of Austria v.
conclusions." Id. at 1200. The briefs of several amici were cited in Justice Kennedy's
opinion. Id. at 1198-1200.
163. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
164. See e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae the European Commission in Support of Neither
Party at i, Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 177036 (indicating that
the European Commission's brief advanced two main arguments: first, that "[t]he
substantive standards imposed by the [Alien Tort] Statute should be defined by reference.
to international law," and second that "the subject matter of the statute should be defined
by reference to the United States's jurisdiction to prescribe."); Brief of Amici Curiae
Alien Friends Representing Hungarian Jews and Bougainvilleans Interests in Support of
Respondent at 6-13, Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 398961
(describing the law of nations, the framers' understanding of how federal courts would
apply the law of nations, and how the federal courts may employ international law as a
form of federal common law in limited circumstances); Brief of Professors of Federal
Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 2, Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 419425. The Professors' brief made three
arguments:
The history and text of the [Alien Tort Statute] establish three basic
propositions: (1) the First Congress intended to provide a federal forum for alien
tort suits; (2) the First Congress understood such suits to be cognizable at
common law without the need for further congressional action; and (3) the First
Congress intended the district courts to have jurisdiction over "all" such torts,
not just those that occurred within the territory of the United States or those that
were recognized in 1789.
Id.
165. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 713 n.10 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)). The
Court explained the narrow reach of the Alien Tort Statute as follows:
We think it is correct, then, to assume that the First Congress understood
that the district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain torts
in violation of the law of nations, though we have found no basis to suspect
Congress had any examples in mind beyond those torts corresponding to
Blackstone's three primary offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of
the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. We assume, too, that no development in
the two centuries from the enactment of § 1350 to the birth of the modern line of
cases beginning with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala has categorically precluded federal
courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of
common law; Congress has not in any relevant way amended § 1350 or limited
civil common law power by another statute. Still, there are good reasons for a
restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should exercise in
considering a new cause of action of this kind. Accordingly, we think courts
should require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with
a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.
Id. at 724-25 (citation omitted).
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166 16Altmann, amici supported both petitioner and respondent, as the
Court considered whether an individual could sue a foreign sovereign for
incidents occurring before the enactment of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act or before the United States adopted the "restrictive
theory" of sovereign immunity.
68
Is the next step in applying international law to constitutional decisions
limited to cases involving international law directly? Or, as in the cases
discussed in this article, is international law a relevant factor in
construing the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? Might a creative
amicus filer find international support for claims involving other
constitutional provisions, or are some provisions so "American" they• • 1 ,169
defy ready comparison to other systems of jurisprudence? Might an
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion is noteworthy for its elegant exposition of federal
common law and the role of the federal judiciary, the latter of which he summarized by
writing that
[w]e Americans have a method for making the laws that are over us. We
elect representatives to two Houses of Congress, each of which must enact the
new law and present it for the approval of a President, whom we also elect. For
over two decades now, unelected federal judges have been usurping this
lawmaking power by converting what they regard as norms of international law
into American law.
Id. at 2776 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The case drew some mainstream media attention, including a Washington Post editorial
endorsing the court's narrow decision:
[T]he justices emphasized that judges should allow suits under the Alien Tort
Statute only when international law is as clear about the matters being raised
today as it was in the 18th century about piracy and attacks on ambassadors.
Moreover, the court rightly restricted the use of nonbinding international legal
instruments in assessing what norms of conduct are clearly established as
international law.
Editorial, Old Law, New Questions, WASH. POST, July 20, 2004, at A16.
166. 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
167. Id. at 680 n.*.
168. Id. at 681. Respondent sued the Republic of Austria to force it to return six
Gustav Klimt paintings that were allegedly stolen by the Nazis. Id. at 680.
Prior to the Nazi invasion of Austria, the paintings had hung in the palatial
Vienna home of respondent's uncle, Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, a Czechoslovakian
Jew and patron of the arts. Respondent claims ownership of the paintings under
a will executed by her uncle after he fled Austria in 1938. She alleges that the
Gallery obtained possession of the paintings through wrongful conduct in the
years during and after World War I1.
Id. at 680-81.
169. Illustrating the difficulties in answering this question, Professor Ramsey suggests
that "the United States is an outlier in protecting rights that few other societies recognize."
Ramsey, supra note 19, at 76. This appears to mean that international sources might be
used to justify restriction of rights. Although there does not appear to be a readiness on
the part of amici to utilize international sources this way, Ramsey suggests that "[i]f we are
serious about the project of using international materials, we must 'take the bitter with the
sweet,' and use international materials to contradict, not merely confirm, our own view of
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international consensus that differs markedly from American practice
serve not as endorsement of that other practice, but as a reinforcement of
the United States' unique history and the culture that flows from it?
The answers to these questions lie only in the future creativity of amicus
filers' and the docket the Supreme Court elects to hear.7 2 Nevertheless,
rights." Id. at 77. To that end, an amicus filer might persuasively argue that other
countries' governments engage in censorship of a certain type of speech or that a given
type of search is not considered unreasonable in the jurisprudence of other legal systems,
to name but a few examples of rights-restrictive, rather than rights-enhancing, use of
international law.
An interesting mention of international practices appeared with respect to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). There, the
Court evaluated "whether courtroom identifications of an accused at trial are to be
excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to the witnesses before trial at
a post-indictment lineup .. .in the absence of the accused's appointed counsel." Id. at
219-20. In evaluating that question, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that
[m]any other nations surround the lineup with safeguards against prejudice
to the suspect. In England the suspect must be allowed the presence of his
solicitor or a friend. Germany requires the presence of retained counsel; France
forbids the confrontation of the suspect in the absence of his counsel; Spain,
Mexico, and Italy provide detailed procedures prescribing the conditions under
which confrontation must occur under the supervision of a judicial officer who
sees to it that the proceedings are officially recorded to assure adequate scrutiny
at trial.
Id. at 238 n.29 (citation omitted).
170. Perhaps the clash between an American constitutional right and international law
is best illustrated by the Second Amendment. One author asserts that
[s]mall arms gun control is the subject of recent international focus and law. The
right to bear arms carries a unique significance in American law and culture and
now faces the possibility of conflict with international gun control. Left
unchecked, international gun control will compromise a fundamental human
right as viewed by U.S. citizens and much of the government. This discussion
explains the United Nations recent efforts of international global gun control and
demonstrates how it conflicts with the American right to bear arms.
Joseph Bruce Alonso, International Law and the United States Constitution in Conflict: A
Case Study on the Second Amendment, 26 HOus. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (2003).
171. In United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), one amicus filing stood out for
its use of international law supporting "the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981 [a section
of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994], which provide[d] a federal civil remedy for
the victims of gender-motivated violence," id. at 601-02, 605. Brief Amici Curiae on
Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of
Petitioners, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (Nos. 99-0005, 99-0029), 1999 WL 1037253. The Court
noted that
Congress explicitly identified the sources of federal authority on which it relied
in enacting § 13981. It said that a "Federal civil rights cause of action" is
established "[plursuant to the affirmative power of Congress ... under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of
Article I [the Commerce Clause] of the Constitution."
Id. at 607 (first two alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a)).
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Nevertheless, the Court "reject[ed] the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly
national and what is truly local." Id. at 617-18 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 568
(1995)). The Court also found that "[s]ection 13981 is not aimed at proscribing
discrimination by officials which the Fourteenth Amendment might not itself proscribe; it
is directed not at any State or state actor, but at individuals who have committed criminal
acts motivated by gender bias," id. at 626, and thus, the federal civil remedy envisioned
was not constitutionally appropriate under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 627.
The Morrison docket featured several amicus filings, including one from international
law scholars and human rights experts, authored in part by an attorney from the Center
for Constitutional Rights. Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars
and Human Rights Experts in Support of Petitioners, supra. For a discussion of the
Center for Constitutional Rights, see supra note 150. The brief's summary of argument
read:
Congress has unquestioned authority to enact legislation to meet both
international treaty and customary law obligations, and need not state the
sources of its authority for legislation to be valid. U.S. ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and other
treaties, empowers Congress to enact legislation implementing the treaty. The
text of the treaty, in conjunction with subsequent unanimous and binding
interpretations by the international community, make clear that the ICCPR
requires the U.S. to provide protection from gender-based violence from both
private persons and public officials. Moreover, that the Executive Branch has
confirmed this view in international proceedings is entitled to great deference.
In addition, the emergence in customary international law of a clear norm
recognizing women's right to live free of gender-based violence, provides
additional constitutional authority for the enactment of the federal civil rights
cause of action at issue in this case. Under Article III, section 2, clause 1 of the
Constitution, the federal courts have authority over all cases arising under the
"laws of the United States" which include customary international law. In
particular, Congress has authority to enact VAWA [Violence Against Women
Act] under both the Define and Punish Clause and under its power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation enabling the federal courts to
exercise its Article III jurisdiction over violations of customary international law.
It is also well-settled and fundamental to the US constitutional system that,
whenever possible, domestic law should be interpreted so as to enable the U.S. to
fulfill its international obligations. This principle strongly supports an
interpretation of both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment that would confirm Congressional authority to enact VAWA and
similar implementing legislation.
Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human Rights Experts in
Support of Petitioners, supra, at 2. The brief proved unavailing, as the Court struck down
the statute in a 5-4 decision, Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627, but the arguments the brief
advanced, chiefly that international law could provide the basis for Congressional
enactments, may yet carry the day.
172. One commentator suggests that the Court will continue its trend toward
embracing international materials because
[g]lobalization has now so pervaded our national culture and identities that a
court that consistently ignores international precedents and experiences when
considering human rights issues, even if merely for their persuasive or moral
weight, risks irrelevancy. Historically, the United States judicial system has not
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any advocate with an interest in advancing its policy objectives through
amicus filing should consider the careful application of international
sources, in the typology described above, as a means of securing
potentially outcome-altering votes when the opinions are issued.
V. CONCLUSION
Amicus filings are useful advocacy tools in the most important cases
that come before the Supreme Court. Amicus briefs serve the purpose of
familiarizing the Court with the interests affected by a given case and
filing an amicus brief is tantamount to a vote on the policy the Court
should adopt. Amicus briefs citing international sources have resonated
with some of the Justices in several cases, and likely will continue to do
so. International law is both relevant and important for amici to consider
in their advocacy and for courts to consider in their decisions. Many
questions of right may depend upon the effective use of international law
and it is only through practice that our legal system will grow accustomed
to its ever-expanding and ever-changing boundaries.
ignored, but responded, to such threats to its legitimacy. Based on that history, it
would be remarkable if a response to the changes marked by globalization and
the breakdown of the dichotomy between national and international human
rights law were not in the offing.
Davis, supra note 149, at 421.
On a broader note regarding the importance of globalization to the traditional
conception of the state and, by extension, its institutions, Professor Louis Henkin suggests
that
for those who care about human rights, the need is to work to make the state
system more human rights-friendly, even in the age of globalization, even taking
globalization into account. Human rights advocates must learn to use the state
system against threats posed by various forms of globalization (in addition to
those presented by governmental abuses). I do not consider globalization to be
beyond or outside the state system. Some sovereign states singly, several of them
together, or all of them together through international institutions, can bend the
globals to their will, and they can do so for human rights purposes. Globalization
does not relieve states of responsibility for the human rights of people subject to
their jurisdiction. The state is required to ensure those human rights which it is
able to protect. It cannot encourage or condone violations.
Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et
Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1999). Professor Henkin's suggestion is one of the
most powerful reasons to support inclusion of international materials in American
jurisprudence: the state must protect the rights of those people under its jurisdiction.
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